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DOUBLE JEOPARDY: CAN NON-MONETARY CIVIL
SANCTIONS CONSTITUTE PUNISHMENT UNDER THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT?
Robyn Schein a Brown

Introduction

mere fact that the lawsuit was civil in nature did not
mean that double jeopardy could not be implicated. lo
The Court further explained that:

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subj ect for the
the determination whether a given civil
same offense to be twice put injeopardy oflife or limb
.... "1 Historically, this protection has been interpreted
sanction constitutes punishment in the
relevant sense requires a particularized
to include three possible scenarios: (1) a second proseassessment of the penalty imposed and
cution for the identical offense after an acquittal; (2) a
the purpose that the penalty may fairly
second prosecution for the identical offense after a
be said to serve. Simply put, a civil as
conviction; or (3) multiple punishments for the same
2
well as criminal sanction constitutes
offense. Although challenges based on the Fifth Amendpunishment when the sanction as apment have traditionally dealt with multiple criminal
plied in the individual case serves the
punishments, the more recent focus on the Double
goal of punishment. II
Jeopardy Clause has not been on criminal sanctions, but
instead on various civil sanctions and whether they
On the one hand, therefore, a civil sanction
constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.
The Supreme Court has thus been forced to attempt to which serves only to compensate the government for its
define what constitutes punishment within the context of losses would not implicate the prohibitions of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. On the other hand, a civil
the prohibitions against double jeopardy.
sanction which was intended as a deterrent or to seek
retribution would constitute "punishment" for double
The Supreme Court Lays the Foundation
jeopardy purposes.1 2 Based on this reasoning, the
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided the case of Court concluded that where the subsequent civil sancUnited States v. Halper 3 and for the first time held that tion "bears no rational relation to the goal of compena civil sanction imposed by the government could con- sating the [g]overnment for its loss, but rather appears
stitute punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy. 4 to qualify as 'punishment' in the plain meaning of the
In Halper, the defendant was convicted of violating a word,"13 the defendant may validly assert a challenge
federal statuteS which prohibits making false claims to those sanctions based on double jeopardy grounds. 14
against the United States Government. 6 Subsequent to The Court cautioned, however, that its interpretation
Halper's conviction, 7the government brought civil charg- was only to apply in "rare case[s]," such as the one the
es against him under the Civil False Claims Act, based on Court was confronted with in Halper. IS
Four years later, the Supreme Court handed
the same conduct for which he was convicted. 8 Halper
then took a direct appeal to the Supreme Court9 on the down its decision in Austin v. United States 16 and held
issue of whether he was twice put injeopardy when the that civil forfeiture could constitute '''payment to a
government proceeded with the subsequent civil law- sovereign as punishment for some offense."'17 In
Austin, the petitioner plead guilty to committing varisuit.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the ous drug offenses. 18 The government subsequently
14 - U. Bait. L.F. / 26.3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

sought to have Austin's mobile home and auto body
shop forfeited since evidence existed that these instrumentalities were "used or intended to be used" to
facilitate Austin's drug operation. 19 Austin opposed the
forfeiture claiming that it violated the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eight Amendment. 20 After an extensive
review of forfeiture at common law,21 the Supreme
Court rejected the United States' claims that forfeiture
was remedial only since the forfeiture: (1) served to
protect the community because it removed instruments
of the drug trade from the streets;22 and (2) compensated "the Government for the expense of law enforcement activity and for its expenditure on societal problems such as urban blight, drug addiction, and other
health concerns resulting from the drug trade."23 Regardless of these arguments, the Court found that since
the civil forfeiture in Austin's case could "only be
explained as serving in part to punish,"24 it could be
subjected to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 25 Austin, therefore, suggests that the
sanction must only be "in part" to punish in order to
violate the defendant's constitutional rights. InHalper,
however, the Court alluded to the fact that the sanction
had to be solely for the purpose of punishment before it
would be subjected to a double jeopardy analysis. 26
Thus, the controversy arises.
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch27 was decided one year after Austin. In Kurth
Ranch, the Court further prodded the issue of what
exactly constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy
purposes. By a 7-2 majority, the Court held that the
imposition of a tax on the possession of dangerous
drugs, after the defendants were convicted of various
possession-related crimes, violated their Fifth Amendment rights. 28 Distinguishing Kurth Ranch from
Halper,29 the Court undertook its own analysis of
whether a tax specifically violated the prohibitions
against double jeopardy. In Kurth Ranch, the Court
found that although "taxes are typically motivated by
revenue-raising rather than punitive purposes,"30 the
prohibitions against double jeopardy were violated,
since: (1) a large part of the tax imposed equated to
more than eight times the market value of the contraband;31 (2) the tax was conditioned upon the commission of a crime;32 and (3) although the tax was characterized as a "property tax," it was imposed only after
the illegal narcotics had been forfeited to the state. 33 The
Court concluded by stating that "[t]his drug tax is not
the kind of remedial sanction that may follow the first

punishment ofa criminal offense," because it rose to the
level of punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 34
The decisions in Halper, Austin, and Kurth
Ranch unsurprisingly opened the door to an entire arena
oflitigation ofwhether various ci viI sanctions constituted punishment for the purposes ofthe Double Jeopardy
Clause. No longer was double jeopardy limited to
criminal actions. Since these three Supreme Court
decisions, lower courts have been forced to grapple
with the issues of when the decisions in Halper, Austin
and Kurth Ranch are binding upon specific cases ofcivil
sanctions, and where exactly to draw the line between
sanctions that are remedial only, and those that are
punitive in nature. Furthermore, lower courts have
found themselves forced to address situations left unanswered by Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch, including
other civil penalties which could possibly constitute
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. These civil
penalties have included the revocation or suspension of
a driver' s license or a professional license, prison disciplinary proceedings, exclusion from participating in
government programs, or the forfeiture of property to
the State. Each ofthese issues will be discussed in more
detail, as well as the effect of the Supreme Court's
definitions of "punishment" on lower courts.

Driver's and Professional License Suspensions
and Revocations
Since Halper was decided in 1989, an overwhelming number ofjurisdictions have been forced to
determine whether, in light ofthe principles enunciated
in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch, suspensions and
revocations of driver's licenses and other professional
licenses implicate the prohibitions of the Double Jeopardy Clause. For a variety of reasons, virtually every
jurisdiction that has been confronted with such a task
has held that the suspension of these licenses does not
violate the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment. 35
With regard to the suspension ofan individual's
driver's license, courts have uniformly held that, although the principles set forth in the three Supreme
Court cases are instructive, their specific situations
were distinguishable from the loss ofa driver' s license. 36
Therefore, although Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch
were not factually binding upon these lower courts, the
Supreme Court's respective analyses were nontheless
employed. Based on the Supreme Court's guidance,
26.3 / U. Bait. L.F. - 15

lower courts have held that license suspension or revocation proceedings do not implicate the double jeopardy
prohibitions for three main reasons. 37
First, many courts have never reached the issue
ofwhether licensing sanctions constitute punishment for
double jeopardy purposes, because these courts have
held that a license revocation or suspension proceeding
is administrative in nature and, therefore, the protections
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause are inapplicable. 38 As stated by the Court of Appeals of Kansas,
"[t]he decision to suspend [the defendant's] driving
privilege is an administrative action and not a criminal
proceeding ... [and] the imposition of administrative
sanctions and criminal prosecutions are not prohibited
under the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause."39 Furthermore, because a proceeding to determine if an individual's license should be suspended or revoked "is entirely
separate and distinct from the proceedings to determine
the guilt or innocence of the person," the protections
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause are not implicated. 4o
Second, the revocation or suspension of a driver's license does not constitute punishment but, instead,
serves other legitimate remedial purposes. These pur.poses include: (1) the promotion of public safety by
removing drunk drivers from state highways;41 (2) providing a mechanism by which authorities can gather
evidence of the commission of a crime;42 and (3) the
rehabilitation of those drivers who are intoxicated. 43
Furthermore, the mere fact that the suspension or revocation of a driver's license may "carry the sting of
punishment" is not dispositive, because the primary
purpose of the sanction is remedial and, thus, double
jeopardy is not implicated. 44 As stated by the Supreme
. Court of New Mexico in State v. Kennedy, "[i]t is
obvious that deterrence of misconduct will be one
practical effect of any regulatory scheme that allows the
government to revoke a license that authorizes a person
to drive motor vehicles or pursue a livelihood. But this
deterrent purpose does not mean that administrative
revocation ofthese licenses is 'punishment' for purposes
of the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause."45 Therefore,
because "the motorist suffers no loss of liberty, no
incarceration or fine as the result of the suspension or
revocation of his license but merely forfeits the privilege
of driving on public highways,"46 the sanction is not
punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
Third, many states have recognized that holding
a driver's license is a privilege and not a right. Hence,

it is within an individual state's police powers to
regulate the holding of a license. 47 In State v. Savard,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine explained this
rationale.
When issued a license, the vehicle operator agrees to abide by certain conditions and rules of the road . . . and
acknowledges that the continued use of
the license to drive is dependent on
compliance with the laws relating to
vehicle operation. A licensee has no
absolute right of ownership in a motor
vehicle operator's license. A licensee's
right to use the license is specifically
conditioned on observing specified
operating standards. The suspension
of that privilege merely signifies the
failure of the holder to comply with
agreed conditions. 48
Therefore, because the government is fully entitled to
regulate the behavior at issue, it is not punishment to
take away an individual's license for any period oftime.
Rather, the government is simply withholding a priv.ilege which the driver forfeited by his own actions. 49
Based on the foregoing reasons, jurisdictions
have consistently held that the suspension of a driver's
license is not one of the "rare cases" described in
Halper in which acivil sanction constitutes punishment
for double jeopardy purposes. 50 Instead, the suspension or revocation of a driver's license "is the all too
common case in which a driver who has repeatedly
endangered the lives and well-being of others by driving while intoxicated is merel y depri ved ofthe pri vilege
to drive for a [specified] period."51
Courts dealing with professional licensing
schemes have also found the prohibitions of double
jeopardy inapplicable. For instance, courts have upheld the restrictions, suspensions, or revocations of
various types of professional licenses, including a
license to practice medicine,52 a license to practice
law,53 a license to operate a funeral home,54 a liquor
license,55 a business license,56 a license to sell insurance,57 and a license to sell real estate. 58 The rationale
for allowing such sanctions is virtually identical to that
of the suspension or revocation of a driver's license.
Namely, the sanction is not punitive in nature, but
rather serves to protect the public from individuals not

16 - U. Bait. L.F. / 26.3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

competent to adequately perform their occupations. 59
Furthermore, since the proceedings are administrative
rather than criminal in nature, double jeopardy has no
bearing upon the sanctions imposed. 60 Therefore, it
could be argued that any type oflicensing scheme would
not be subject to the claim that a revocation or suspension of that license constitutes punishment for double
jeopardy purposes.

Prison Disciplinary Proceedings
Another area ofthe double jeopardy controversy
which has continually surfaced despite the Supreme
Court's decisions in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch is
that of prison disciplinary proceedings. Various jurisdictions throughout the nation have consistently held
that prison disciplinary proceedings do not implicate the
prohibitions outlined in the Double Jeopardy Clause of
theFifthAmendment. 61 Many courts have further found
Halper inapplicable to these proceedings because Halper
involved a criminal prosecution followed by a civil suit
for the same behavior.62 Kurth Ranch was similarly
limited to only those situations where a tax was imposed
as the penalty at issue. 63 Austin has not even been
discussed within the context of prison disciplinary proceedings. Hence, since the three Supreme Court cases
dealt with manifestly different issues than that ofa prison
disciplinary sanction, they were not binding upon these
lower courts. Therefore, any argument that disciplinary
actions by prison officials followed by a subsequent
criminal prosecution implicates the prohibitions against
double jeopardy will be futile.
The disciplinary sanctions often imposed upon
inmates who have violated prison rules commonly include: (1) solitary confinement or other types of segregation from the rest of the prison population,64 (2) loss
of good time credit,65 (3) loss of privileges, (4) a
disciplinary transfer, or (5) a reduction in the prisoner's
status. 66 Regardless of which sanction is imposed,
however; courts have found the proscriptions of double
jeopardy inapposite for several reasons.
First, a prison disciplinary proceeding is not the
equivalent of a "criminal prosecution" or trial which
-would implicate the proscriptions against double jeoparcly.67 Therefore, since a disciplinary hearing is not a
judicial proceeding with the purpose of determining the
guilt or innocence of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt, double jeopardy does not come into play.68
Second, the purpose of a prison disciplinary

sanction is not punitive in nature. Rather, it is to
maintain order and promote security within the entire
prison system. 69 As stated by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
[p]unitive interests and remedial interests ... are nowhere so tightly intertwined as in the prison setting, where
the government's remedial interest is to
maintain order and to prevent violent
altercations among a population ofcriminals. Accordingly, the mere fact that a
sanction imposed by prison officials has
a punitive component does not mean
that the sanction constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. 70
Therefore, the promotion of internal security within the
prison system, while conveying to other inmates that
such behavior will not be tolerated, is not equated to
punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
Third, courts have found that these disciplinary
sanctions serve to rehabilitate the prisoner rather than
punish him. As stated by the Colorado Court of
Appeals, "[b ]reaches of prison regulations reflect an
inmate's disregard for rules of social and prison life and
threaten prison security. Remediation of such infractions, therefore, is essential both to promote inmate
rehabilitation and to maintain order."71
When confronted with a double jeopardy challenge in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings,
courts have held that broad discretion should be allotted to prison officials and their judgments as to the
appropriate sanction to be imposed in any given case. 72
In United States v. Newby, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that this discretion was given to prison officials in large part because:
the adoption and execution of policies
and practices necessary to preserve
internal order and discipline, and to
maintain institutional security in the
prison are "peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officers, and, in the absence of
substantial evidence in the record to
indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response[,] courts should
ordinarily defer to their expert judg26.3 I U. Bait. L.F. - 17

ment in such matters."73
Courts have noted that these same prison officials should not be faced with the various problems that
could arise if the Double Jeopardy Clause were found
applicable to these disciplinary proceedings. For example, if discipline by prison authorities barred a subsequent criminal prosecution, prison officials would then
be forced to choose between implementing the sanctions within the prison system and forfeiting the possibility of any criminal prosecution, or the reverse. 74
Furthermore, since bringing an inmate to trial could
take a considerable amount oftime, the "difficulties and
delay that a criminal prosecution entails would leave the
prisoners who violated the prison rules without a prompt
resolution of charges and hinder prison administration
and discipline."75 Finally, one court recognized that it
would be absurd on the one hand to allow "those
violations of prison regulations that do not rise to the
level of criminal behavior [to] come within prison
officials' duty to maintain prison discipline, while more
heinous behavior is beyond their reach except at the cost
of precluding subsequent criminal prosecution. "76
Therefore, as long as the prison officials are acting
within their prescribed limits, the sanctions they choose
to impose will not be successfully challenged on double
jeopardy grounds.

Exclusion from Participation in Government Programs
The double jeopardy controversy has also had
little impact on the exclusion of individuals from participation in government programs. As with the other civil
sanctions discussed, courts have held that the exclusion
from government programs is remedial only, and therefore not punishment for double jeopardy purposes. For
example, courts have upheld the exclusion of doctors
from Medicare programs when it was shown that the
doctors made fraudulent claims to these Medicare
agencies. 77 Other areas of governmental exclusion have
also been upheld, such as participation in the commodities trading market,18 HUD housing programs,19 and
the Federal Drug Administration Program. 80 The rationale for these exclusions was very similar to that of the
revocation or suspension of an individual's driver's
license or professionallicense--protection ofthe public
and of the industry. As explained by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:

the decision to exclude [the defendant]
from any contract market can be seen as
an action to ensure the integrity of the
markets and protect them from people
like [the defendant]. Commodities and
instruments representing billions ofdollars are traded on the nation's contract
markets every year. Maintaining a fair
and unadultered open market is a profound and necessary pursuit for our
economic well-being. Iffraudulent practices undermining the integrity of the
markets were to proceed unchecked,
the vital efficiency of the market mechanism would bejeopardized. 81
Courts dealing with similar governmental prohibitions
have reached the same conclusion, holding that, although the individuals may consider the sanctions to be
punishment, "rough remedial justice" cannot be equated to punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 82 Furthermore, the severity or duration of the exclusion is of
no import and will not serve to make an otherwise
permissible sanction punishment within the prohibitions
of double jeopardy.83
Finally, one court outlined a number of factors
which should be considered when determining whether
a civil sanction is remedial or punitive in nature. These
factors include:
[w]hetherthe sanction involves an affirmative disability ofrestraint, whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, whether its
operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment -- retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for
it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned .... 84
Therefore, taking all things into consideration, courts
have uniformly held that the exclusion from government
programs is not one of those "rare cases" enunciated in
Halper which mandates the application of the Double
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Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 85

do what is in the best interests of the child) and not to
punish the parent offender. 91
Other Civil Sanctions Deemed Remedial
Holding an individual in contempt ofcourt and
ordering imprisonment unless that individual affirmaLower courts have also found other civil sanc- tively decides to purge the contempt does not implicate
tions remedial only and, therefore, not in violation ofthe the Double Jeopardy Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment. 92
Double Jeopardy Clause. Although these areas have not Courts have held that because a contempt proceeding
received as much attention as the suspension or revoca- is civil in nature,93 and, more importantly, because the
tion of a driver' s or professional license, prison disciplin- contemnor "[holds] the keys in his own pocket"94 since
ary proceedings, or the exclusion from participation in he alone is capable of purging the contempt charge, the
government programs, they nevertheless deserve to be double jeopardy prohibitions are not violated when a
mentioned as evidence of how lower courts have inter- criminal suit is also brought in conjunction with the
preted "punishment" within the context of the double contempt charge.
jeopardy prohibitions.
Finally, courts have held that other civil sancFor example, the expulsion of a child from tions designed to serve remedial purposes only do not
school followed by juvenile proceedings arising out of implicate the prohibitions of double jeopardy. Such
the same conduct was held not to violate the principles sanctions include: (1) the reduction of an individual's
of double jeopardy. 86 Courts addressing this issue have pension;95 (2) the withholding of vacation benefits from
generally found that the expulsion did not rise to the level employees found to have engaged in criminal conof punishment for double jeopardy purposes since: (1) duct;96 (3) a dishonorable discharge from the military;97
the expulsion from school did not equate to a criminal (4) the civil commitment ofanindividual;98 and (5) the
prosecution which would subject the child to the double awarding of punitive damages in a civil suit between
jeopardy analysis; and (2) the purpose ofthe expulsion private parties. 99 Therefore, although courts have been
was to protect the other students rather than to penalize careful not to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause where
the individual who committed the offense. As explained the sanction is remedial only, a flurry oflitigation has
by the Court of Appeals of Arizona:
nevertheless erupted in all areas of civil law which
impose any penalties upon the wrongdoer.
school officials, as a body and individually, have a responsibility for maintaining
Forfeiture of Property by a Sovereign
order upon the school premises so that
the education, teaching and training of
Whether the forfeiture of illegal proceeds by a
the students may be accomplished in an
sovereign constitutes double jeopardy has caused great
atmosphere oflaw and order. In measurdissention among and within the various jurisdictions
ing the reasonableness of an expulsion,
which have addressed the issue. One would conjecture
courts must give credence to the role and
that the Supreme Court's decisions in Halper, Austin,
purpose of the schools and the means
and Kurth Ranch made the issue a simple one for lower
available to school administrators to deal
courts. Such was not the case. The Supreme Court's
with their problemsY
"guidance" as to what should constitute punishment
for double jeopardy purposes has only further muddied
Furthermore, the termination of parental rights the waters for courts deciding if forfeiture bars a
followed by a criminal prosecution for child abuse or criminal prosecution. In fact, lower courts have disneglect has been held not to implicate prohibitions agreed on virtually every aspect ofthe double jeopardy
against double jeopardy.88 The rationale for such a analysis, inc1udingwhether a civil forfeiture ofproperty
finding is that a proceeding to terminate parental rights along with a criminal prosecution constitutes the "same
is not a criminal prosecution designed to determine offense" for double jeopardy purposes, whether such
innocence or guilt and, therefore, double jeopardy does actions are part of the same proceeding for double
not come into play.89 Furthermore, the purpose of the jeopardy purposes, whether a civil forfeiture constitermination of parental rights is to "provide children tutes "punishment," and whether the three Supreme
with permanent and stable family relationships,"90 (i.e., Court cases are even applicable to a forfeiture proceed26.3 / U. Bait. L.F. - 19

ing. loo Therefore, as one might expect, various cases
addressing the issue of whether civil forfeiture constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes have
reached conflicting conclusions.
The majority of lower courts addressing the
issue have found that the principles of double jeopardy
are not implicated when a sovereign brings an action to
forfeit an individual's property. These courts have
based their findings on a number of criteria. First, the
main reason for finding double jeopardy inapposite to a
civil forfeiture is that the forfeiture is remedial in nature
and not punitive. 101 In making such a determination,
these courts have pointed to a number of factors as
evidence that the specific statutory forfeiture provisions
are remedial onl y. Some considerations include the fact
that various statutes provide for a limited use of the
property once forfeited to the state,102 the owner of
illegal proceeds has no property interest in the objects
forfeited to the state,103 and that a forfeiture proceeding
carries with it a lesser burden of proof than a criminal
prosecution. 104
Second, courts examining the purpose of these
forfeiture statutes have found that since they do not
serve to punish, the prohibitions against double jeopardy are not implicated. Several purposes of forfeiture
provisions have been enunciated by lower courts. The
most common of these purposes is the situation where
forfeiting an individual's property used in illegal activities provides compensation to the government for the
cost of prosecution of such cases. 105 Other purposes
espoused by various lower courts include the forfeiture
of property in order to "abate past offending uses of
property and prevent future offending uses of the
property,"106 and in cases where the amount forfeited is
relatively small, "to save the government the time and
expense of[a] judicial [forfeiture] proceeding. "107 Courts
which have found the principles of double jeopardy
inapplicable to an in rem civil forfeiture action have
focused primarily on the compensation of the government as a legitimate purpose of the forfeiture provision
at issue.
A third reason why some courts have dismissed
the notion that a civil forfeiture proceeding implicates
the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause
is that, when dealing with a statute permitting the
forfeiture of property intended to be used in illicit
activity, the intention of use is a separate and distinct
offense from the possession ofillicit materials or contraband. los Therefore, double jeopardy is not violated

because the defendant is not twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Finally, in various cases, courts have avoided
the issue of whether civil forfeiture constitutes punishment altogether. Instead, these courts have found that
since the defendants did not contest the civil forfeiture,
they were not placed in jeopardy a first time, so as to
preclude a second jeopardy by a criminal prosecution. 109
As explained by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Clark, "the forfeiture was not
contested, and we have recently held that a 'summary
forfeiture, by definition, can never serve as ajeopardy
component of a double jeopardy motion. "'110
Courts upholding the various forfeiture proceedings as constitutional have distinguished the forfeitures at issue from the facts of Halper. III Nevertheless,
these same courts have employed the Halper rationale
and have concluded that the various forfeitures were
rationally related to the offenses committed and were
not so disproportionate in nature as to rise to the level
of punishment for double jeopardy purposes. I12
Although the majority of courts confronted
with the issue have held that civil forfeiture does not
implicate the prohibitions of double jeopardy, a growing minority have found that civil forfeiture may, in fact,
prevent a criminal prosecution. The courts have relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Austin,
regardless ofthe factthatAustin only dealt directly with
the issue of punishment in the context of the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause. I13 As explained by
the Court of Appeals of Louisiana in State v. 1979
Cadillac Deville, "[a]lthoughnot specifically deciding
adoublejeopardyclaiminAustin, the Court's reasoning
makes it clear that double jeopardy applies in [a civil
forfeiture case] because forfeiture of derivative contraband is not solely remedial, and therefore it constitutes
punishment." I14
Using the rationale ofA ustin, some jurisdictions
have found that civil forfeiture proceedings implicate
the prohibitions of double jeopardy because these procedures do, in fact, constitute punishment for double
jeopardy purposes. For example, many courts have
pointed out the fact that various statutes provided for an
"innocent owner defense," whereby an individual may
be exempt from the forfeiture of his property ifhe can
show that he did not know that his property was being
used for illicit purposes, leads to the conclusion that
those statutes aim to punish the offenders who do not
fall into the category of "innocent owners."IIS

Furthermore, these courts have also found that
the forfeiture of property does constitute the "same
offense" as the criminal prosecution. 1I6 Using the
"same elements test" derived from Blockberger v.
United States,J17 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit explained that:
the forfeiture and conviction are punishment for the same offense because the
forfeiture necessarily requires proof of
the criminal offense .... Even though
the standard of proof is more easily met
in the civil action, the fact remains that
the government cannot confiscate [the
defendant's] residence without a showing that he was manufacturing marijuana. lls
Therefore, when proof of the underlying felony is
necessary for the forfeiture ofthe individual's property,
courts have generally held that the subsequent forfeiture proceeding is barred by double jeopardy principles.
Some courts have held that a forfeiture that
partially serves remedial purposes is not dispositive for
double jeopardy purposes. Following the Supreme
Court's guidance, one lower court found that "[i]n the
wake of Austin and Kurth Ranch, we believe that a
forfeiture under the [specific forfeiture statute] constitutes punishment even though it may serve sonie remedial purposes. "119 Finally, courts also have opined that
the fallacious belief that the forfeiture of property
removes a dangerous item from society will no longer
be a valid defense to the forfeiture of that property.
Although such a rationale may be appropriate when the
item to be seized is contraband, the rationale loses its
credibility when the items to be seized are an individuai's home or motor home. 120
Although the various federal and state statutes
permitting the forfeiture of property upon the coinmission of a crime may vary somewhat and therefore
partially account for the differing holdings among lower
courts, forfeiture will nevertheless continue to be a
source of great debate among lower courts. Regardless
of the statute at issue in any given case, lower courts
have continually had difficulty in coming to terms with
whether forfeiture constitutes punishment for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause and whether the
three seminal Supreme Court cases in reality aid the
lower courts in their quest.

Conclusions
Upon close examination ofthe evolution of the
Double Jeopardy Clause over the past six years and how
courts have defined punishment in the context of civil
proceedings, it becomes apparent that what was originally espoused in Halper as the "rare case" has come
full circle. As evidenced by the previous civil sanctions
discussed, the scope ofthe decisions in Halper, Austin,
and Kurth Ranch have arguably reached an entirely new
level never contemplated by the Justices who handed
down these three Supreme Court decisions. The "rare
case" enunciated in Halper over six years ago has been
transformed into the "common case" in an attempt to
encompass virtually all areas ofcivil law which impose
any type ofsanction upon the wrongdoer. The warnings
by the Court in Halper that "[w]hat we announce now
is a rule for the nire case, the case such as the one before
us, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific
but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the damages he has caused,"121
have practically gone unnoticed. Until the Supreme
Court affirmatively addresses the limitations ofHalper
to civil sanctions other than those discussed in Halper,
lower courts will undoubtedly continue to grapple with
the phenomena ofwhat civil sanctions, ifany, constitute
punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
Furthermore, it is also a distinct possibility that
although some of these lower courts may, in fact, have
viewed the civil sanctions as additional punishments for
double jeopardy purposes, they have nevertheless chosen to hide behind the Supreme Court's rationales in
Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch in an effort to reach
an equitable result. For example, it would seem ridiculous in a case where a doctor has been convicted of
sexually assaulting his patients to bar the subsequent
revocation or suspension of his license due to the
prohibitions of twice being placed injeopardy for the
same offense. In the same instance, it would seem
equally ridiculous to prohibit the doctor's criminal
prosecution due to the previous suspension or revocation of his license. The same analysis would follow for
the suspension or revocation of a driver's license or
prison disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the lower
courts have quite possibly attempted to rationalize their
findings by holding the principles of double jeopardy
inapplicable. While the civil sanctions in reality may
constitute a punishment for the offense committed, it is
unlikely that courts will openly declare this fact and
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allow society to suffer the consequences of prohibiting
one form of punishment, whether it be the criminal
prosection or the civil sanction.
Finally, lower courts have struggled with the
appropriate standard to apply in determining whether
the civil sanction involved is remedial only or if it rises
to the level ofpunishment for double jeopardy purposes.
Halper, in 1989, announced that "a civil sanction that
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose,
but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we
have come to understand the term."122 Austin, on the
other hand, explained that the forfeiture of property
could be subjected to the principles of double jeopardy
if "it can only be explained as serving in part to
punish."123 Based upon these two principles, the question then becomes: must ute sanction be solely for
punitive purposes before it will be barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause, or must it only be in part to punish
before the double jeopardy analysis will come into play?
Put in other terms, does Austin seek to further explain
what was originally enunciated in Halper, or does it
create a new standard to apply? Once again, before
further clarification is provided by the Supreme Court on
the proper standard to apply, lower courts will continully
be in conflict regarding which rule, if either, should be
followed when faced with a double jeopardy challenge.
In sum, beginning in 1989 with the decision in
United States v. Halper, a multitude of litigation has
reached federal and state courts regarding which civil
sanctions, if any, necessitate the application of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Due
to the newly espoused principles by the Supreme Court
in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch, itis unlikely that the
debate will end quickly or quietly, as courts try to define
what constitutes punishment in the civil arena so that
defendants may receive the full protections afforded by
the Fifth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution:
to be free from twice being put injeopardy for the same
offense.
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RODGERS TAVERN 1695
Susquehanna River traffic brought many visitors to the tavern, located at the site ofthe Lower Ferry in
Perryville, Maryland, directly across the river from Havre de Grace. Most notably, George Washington
was a frequent guest during the late 18th Century. This formidable stone structure is the birthplace of
Commodore John Rodgers, founder of the United States Navy.
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